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## INFORMATION REPORT

PREPARED AND DISSEMINATED BY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

COUNTRY

Poland/USSR

SUBJECT

Interpretation of Gomulka's Reassumption of Power/Danger in Overestimating Damage to USSR

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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

1. [ ] the events of the last few weeks leading to the election of Wladyslaw Gomulka as First Secretary of the United Workers' Party and the removal of Marshal Konstantin K Rokossovsky are of the greatest significance and deserve the attention they have received in the West. [ ] somewhat more doubtful, however, whether they should be interpreted as the beginning of Poland's return to independence, if by Poland is meant the broad mass of the Polish people. Rather [ ] these events appear to have insured a modicum of independence to the Polish Communists who, with relatively few exceptions, are anti-Russian and, along with the non-Communist Poles, have almost as strong a dislike for the Russians as for the Germans. If the Polish people, including the working class, had their say, they would undoubtedly have reinstated Gomulka to his rightful place in the Communist Party, but they would have given the Socialists a much stronger representation in the top management of Party and [ ]  
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2. If should be realized that Gomulka still will not have a majority of the new Politburo behind him, although his strength in Poland and even in the Polish Communist Party has never been greater. As [ ] previously indicated [ ]  
Edward Ochab is an old Stalinist; the fact that he stood up to [ ]  
Nikita Khrushchev merely shows that he correctly interpreted developments within Poland and refused to defend a position which was already lost. On the other hand, Ochab has been reelected to the new Politburo with a larger vote even than that given to Gomulka and must be seriously reckoned with in the 50X1-HUM future. In the politburo, Ochab will generally be able to count on the support of Aleksander Zawadzki, Roman Zambrowski, Jerzy Morawski and Stefan Jedrzejowski. Gomulka, on the other hand, has only one member of the Politburo committed to him in the person of Ignacy Loga-Sovinski. In addition, he should be able to count on support from the two Socialists, Jozef Cyrankiewicz and Adam Rapacki. Thus, even if the Socialists are going to back Gomulka as the lesser of two evils, Gomulka may find himself in a minority in the policy-making and all important Politburo.  
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3. [ ] it would be unwise for the West to bank on Gomulka too strongly. Regardless of his stand vis-a-vis the Soviets, he is still a Communist and may yet be forced by economic circumstances to play to some extent the Soviet game even though he won in the political and perhaps military field. On the other hand, the Socialists appear to deserve the full backing of the West in the present circumstances both because they are not ideologically in as difficult a position and because they constitute, as a political group, a strong block. It is most important in these difficult days that the West not give any backing to Ochab and his group, either through any tangible action or in terms of propaganda, because Poland's independence from the USSR will not be guaranteed as long as Ochab and his opportunist friends remain in positions of power in Poland.
4. One of the negative aspects of the recent Polish events is their effect on the Soviet Communist Party. [ ] developments in Poland will tend to

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reunify various elements in the Party, because of the "soft" policy initiated by Khrushchev. For the moment, there must be reverberations in the Soviet Presidium, and [ ] it likely that Khrushchev himself will lose his lofty position. Thereafter, however, the Soviet Party is likely to evolve as a more united organization than it has been for quite some time.

- end -

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